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COMMENTS
GRIFFITH v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.: A JUSTIFICATION
FOR UNCERTAINTY
In the quest for the rule of law, we must insist on including its
reasons, and on lifting them out into the open. That human death
may or may not be the subject of an action, - that truth is or is
not a defense for the libeller, - that a judge is privileged abso-
lutely or only qualifiedly, - that a secondary boycott is or is not
justifiable, - all these rules and principles rest on reasons of
some sort; they may be reasons of ethics, of politics, of economics,
of public health, or a dozen other sorts. They may be found in
experience or dogma. But they are given to us independently of
the rule of law itself. The rule of law must be tested by the
philosophy of the subject . . . we must be students of reasons as
well as of rules. And the conservative needs this quite as much
as the reformer.'
A rule of law, once adopted, becomes programmed into the intellectual
apparatus of our legal system. It has a tendency to be accepted without
further justification. Its constant repetition in effect makes it self-evidently
correct. When such a rule creates unreasonable results, it becomes the
duty of the courts to consider the basis of the rule, be it policy, expediency
or whatever. A rule is not a rule merely because it is a rule, but rather
because it is based on the reasonable needs of a particular society. 2
The rule which has most recently come tinder such judicial scrutiny
is that of lex loci delicti. The Pennsylvania court, having applied the above
analysis, recently rejected this inflexible rule which applies the law of the
place of the wrong in a choice of law situation. Griffith v. United Airlines,
Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964).
Deceased plaintiff, George H. Hambrecht, was a domiciliary of Penn-
sylvania when he purchased a round-trip ticket to Phoenix, Arizona, from
United- Airlines, Inc. He boarded the Phoenix-bound plane in Philadel-
phia, but was killed when it crashed in Denver, Colorado, a scheduled stop.
United, a Delaware corporation, has its principal place of business in
Chicago. It regularly does business in Pennsylvania and maintains oper-
ational facilities therein.
After decedent's will had been probated in Pennsylvania, his executor
brought an action in assumpsit against United and certain of its employees
for breach of contract to transport decedent safely from Philadelphia to
1. WIGrORE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS ii (1st ed. 1928).
2. Contra, Roberts, A Rule Is A Rule Because It Is the Rule: Intellectual Crisis
In Conflict of Laws, 9 VILL. L. REv. 200 (1964).
(100)
1
Bernstein and Freilich: Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.: A Justification for Uncertain
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1964
FALL 1964]
Phoenix. Plaintiff alleged that "certain of United's named employees, in
the course of their employment, had negligently operated, managed, main-
tained, inspected and controlled the airplafie, from which negligence the
crash and death resulted." '3
The Court of Common Pleas sustained the cause of action as to United
but dismissed the individual defendants. However, the Court further held
that the law of the place of the injury, Colorado, must control on the
matter of damages and gave plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to
conform to the Colorado Survival Statute. Plaintiff filed no amendment
and the action was dismissed, which dismissal was appealed to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held, five to one, that the law of the forum,
Pennsylvania, was to control the question of damages. In so doing, the
Court expressly overruled clear precedent reasserted as recently as 19634
that the law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sus-
tained a legal injury. The so-called lex loci delicti rule, as the dissent
aptly pointed out, was deeply entrenched in Pennsylvania jurisprudence,
but though the Court was given an opportunity to avoid a great confronta-
tion with the issue,5 it directly attacked this opinion and reversed its former
position. Mr. Justice Roberts stated that the "wooden application of a
few overly simple rules, based on the outmoded 'vested rights theory,' can-
not solve the complex problems which arise in modern litigation and may
often yield harsh, unnecessary and unjust results."'6 The majority went on
to say that in adopting this new approach it must, of necessity, overrule its
earlier cases based on lex loci delicti.
The newly-adopted rule conforms with the position advocated by the
Restatement Conflict of Laws 2d7 "that torts should be governed by the
3. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 797 (Pa. 1964).
4. Vant v. Gish, 412 Pa. 359, 194 A.2d 522 (1963).
5. There were two routes the court could have followed and completely avoided
the entire question of the lex loci delicti rule. Since in Pennsylvania there still exists
a distinction between assumpsit and trespass actions, the court could have based its
opinion on these distinctions. The action was brought in assumpsit and could easily
have been disposed of as such. It could either have been decided to be an allowable
contract action in which the Colorado limitation would not apply or an action that
could only properly be brought in trespass. The court, however, apparently chose to
ignore the distinctions between the two, stating: ". . . under the facts before us, an
action for simple breach of contract would not and could not justify a substantial
recovery by plaintiff. The essentials of this case remain the same regardless of the
label. Mere technicalities of pleading should not blind us to the true nature of the
action. The choice of law will be the same whether the action is labeled trespass or
assumpsit." Lex loci has traditionally been a rule in trespass, a point apparently
overlooked by the court in the previous statement.
This oversight has apparently created a new warranty, one of "non-negligent
carriage" rather than one of "safe carriage." This was an attempt on the court to
avoid the latter warranty which they felt would make the carrier an insurer.
The most sensible avoidance procedure would have been to adopt the rationale in
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961). Since the
court by its decision has shown that it was determined to decide Griffith on tort
principles, it could easily have adopted Kilberg, holding that the public policy of the
forum precluded application of the limitation of the lex loci state and that measure
of damages was, in fact, a procedural matter to be governed by the law of the forum.
6. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 801 (Pa. 1964).
7. RESTATEMENT (SXcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
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local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and the parties, and that separate rules apply to different kinds
of torts." The contacts that are considered to be significant in such
a determination are: place of injury, place of conduct, domicile of the
parties and place where the relationship between the parties is centered.
In applying these principles to the instant case it can readily be seen
that the state where the injury occurred had little interest in the amount
of recovery, since none of its citizens were involved or affected. Penn-
sylvania, on the other hand, had significant interest in the litigation. The
deceased and his family were domiciled there, his estate was probated and
administered there and the relationship between decedent and defendant
was entered into there. Therefore, under the new "most significant con-
tacts" or "center of gravity" test the law of the forum must be applied. The
Court recognized the problems that can arise from the institution of this
rule, however, it held that "ease of application and predictability are in-
sufficient reasons to retain an unsound rule."9
Thus with the instant case, Pennsylvania has joined a modern trend
in the abolition of the place of the injury rule. This trend began with
exceptions to the rule.' 0 In Auten v. Auten," New York abandoned the
traditional choice of law rules in contracts cases in favor of a "center of
gravity" theory. Finally, in Babcock v. Jackson,12 New York applied this
reasoning to an action in trespass. Judge Fuld, in Babcock, concluded that
that "justice, fairness and the 'best practical result' . . . may best be
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which,
because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has
the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation." 13
The Court points out that although the overwhelming majority of
writers are opposed to retention of the place of the injury rule, there is
disagreement as to the successor to that rule.' 4 Justice Roberts, in aban-
doning the strict lex loci delicti rule, appoints as its successor "a more
flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying
the particular issue before the court." 15
"For over 100 years the law of Pennsylvania has been clearly settled,
namely, the substantive rights of the parties, as well as the damages re-
coverable are governed by the law of the place of the wrong or as it is
sometimes expressed, the law of the place where the injury occurred -
lex loci delicti,"'6 so states Chief Justice Bell in his dissent in Griffith v.
8. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 802 (Pa. 1964).
9. Id. at 803.
10. Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949).
11. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
12. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
13. Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283.
14. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964); Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. Rv.
1212 (1963) ; New Trends in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 673
(1963).
15. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 805 (Pa. 1964).
16. Id. at 808 (dissenting opinion).
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United Airlines.'7 He further points out that the majority opinion demon-
strates:
(a) that it is impossible to formulate at this time a new and different
test which can be applied with definiteness and certainty to many
varied situations, and (b) it concedes that there is widespread 'dis-
agreement among the critics as to the successor to that rule,' i.e., lex
loci delicti, and that it will likely have to be developed and changed,
and (c) that it will also almost inevitably and unnecessarily create
instability, uncertainty, confusion and conflict of law throughout our
Country, and will undoubtedly greatly increase the volume of litiga-
tion which is already swamping Courts, and thereby further delay
speedy justice.' 8
The position taken by the Chief Justice represents the common arguments
made in opposition to changing the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the prevailing
rule in the United States. The argument consists of two basic tenents:
(1) stare decisis and (2) the uncertainty of application. Thus it is argued
that the abandonment of these two tenents must result in legal chaos.
The argument of stare decisis has been raised in other contexts in the
past; however, both the judiciary19 and legal philosophers 20 have expressed
the opinion that this argument also should not be sufficient to prevent legal
reform. Benjamin Cardozo succinctly demonstrated this point in his book
on the judicial process.
The common law does not work from pre-established truths of uni-
versal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them de-
ductively. Its method is inductive, and it draws its generalization from
particulars.21
Cardozo expounds further on this principle by quoting Munroe Smith.
In their effort to give to the social sense of justice articulate expres-
sion in rules and in principles, the method of the lawfinding experts
has always been experimental. The rules and principles of case law
have never been treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses,
continually retested in those great laboratories of the law, the courts
of justice. Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule
which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the
rule is reconsidered. It may not be modified at once, for the attempt to
do absolute justice in every single case would make the development
and maintenance of general rules impossible; but if a rule continues
17. 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964).
18. Id. at 809 (dissenting opinion).
19. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, 414 Pa. 94, 199 A.2d
266 (1964).
While it is true that great consideration should always be accorded precedent,
especially one of long ,standing and general acceptance, it doesn't necessarily follow
that a rule merely established by precedent is infallible. Moreover, the courts
should not perpetrate error solely for the reason that a previous decision, although
erroneous, has been rendered on a given question.... If it is wrong it should notbe continued. Judicial honesty dictates corrective action. Id. at 100, 199 A.2d
at 268.
20. CARDOZO, Tut NATURE OF THZ JUDICIAL PROCESS 22 (1921).
21. Id. at 22-3.
COMMENTS .103
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1964], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss1/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
to work injustice, it will eventually be reformulated. The principles
themselves are continually retested; for if the rules derived from a
principle do not work well, the principle itself must ultimately be re-
examined. 22
Since so much has been written on the pros and cons of stare decisis this
comment will be confined on the most part to a discussion of the second
tenent, uncertainty.
Further the scope of inquiry of this note is limited to the "predicta-
bility" of which state's interest will be dominant. Indeed it is "predicta-
bility" and "consistency" that is meant by the use of the term certainty.
This note emphatically avoids the meaning of "immutability," for a law
which is static and does not contain within itself the seeds either of devel-
opment or of self-destruction is the law of a dead society. Moreover, law
is always subject to change by the legislature.
The debate on legal certainty has sometimes been partisan and extreme.
Blackstone23 regarded law as something permanent, uniform and pre-
determined, which was subject to change by the legislature but not by the
judges. On the other hand, Judge Frank24 believed that law always has
been, is now and will ever continue to be largely vague and variable, and
that much of the uncertainty is of immense social value. In fact he char-
acterized the notion of legal certainty as an illusion or a myth.
Somewhere between these extremes lies the preponderance of juristic
opinion. The quest for certainty is respected but its complete attainment is
impossible. For the basis of our system of fact-finding remains human
evaluation of human testimony, and, so long as this is so, some uncertainty
is inevitable.
It is argued that the uncertainty caused by our jury system is in-
herent to our legal system and has developed as the best possible means of
providing justice for all. Yet, succeeding generations may reduce this
uncertainty by substituting brain-washing, truth drugs and lie detectors.
The advocate of the doctrine of certainty readily concedes the "un-
knowability" of facts, but condemns the instant case as causing unpre-
dictability in the "unknowability" of the "rules." He argues that lex loci
delicti had its greatest value in its predictability. It is an obvious rule,
easily understood and easily applied. In its place the court has adopted an
"interest analysis" approach rather than a rule.
Part of the uncertainty caused by the new rule stems from the imper-
fections of language - the chief tool of the lawyer's trade. Semanticists
have long been concerned with the ambiguities of language, and the sem-
antic technique is of great value in the solution of some judicial problems.2 5
The problem of uncertainty must be viewed in the realization of the law's
22. SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909), as cited in Id. at 23.
23. BLACKSTONE, LEGAL COMMENTARIES (Sharwoods ed. 1900).
24. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
25. See Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. Rv. 71, 179, 293, 384 (1945);
62 L.Q. REv. 387 (1946).
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dependence on the use of words indicating qualities of continuing varia-
tion. For example, negligence is defined as conduct which falls short of the
standard of the reasonable man. The conduct required of an actor is that
of an "ideal" individual under the same circumstances. Thus the whole
theory of negligence presupposes a uniform standard of behavior of a
uniform man. Yet, as Dean Prosser states, "the infinite variety of situa-
tions which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules in advance
for all conceivable human conduct. The utmost that can be done is to
devise something in the nature of a formula, the application of which in
each particular case must be left to the jury, or to the court. '26
Negligence is not the only field in which basic concepts are uncertain.
Even an area as basic to our system as constitutional law is fraught with
uncertainties. In recent decisions the Supreme Court has aptly shown the
variability of due process,27 fair play and substantial justice28 and the
concept of equal protection.29 In criminal law the act committed must be
sufficiently proximate to constitute an attempt to commit a criminal act.3 0
As can be seen from the aforementioned examples, our body of law is con-
structed of many legal "uncertainties." Yet we still have not been faced
with the absolute chaos that those who oppose the institution of this new
rule warn us is inevitable.
There can be no doubt that this new rule will create new problems.
Every judicial reform necessitates the passage of time to establish precedent.
It might be useful here, however, to raise a few of the problems that will
inevitably arise under this new theory. From such analysis of the new
rule, working guidelines, equivalent in certainty of application to lex loci
delicti, will arise.
All of the critics of the new rule have assumed that lex loci delicti has
been abandoned, but is this really true? At first blush, the answer must be
yes. But after a careful analysis and projection of the problems in this
area, the conclusion can be drawn that the courts, having realized the rigid
restrictions of this antiquated rule, are merely attempting to add some
flexibility to it. Considering the new rule from this point of view, we may
better approach the problems that can arise in different but possible factual
situations.
In a great many situations it will be obvious that one jurisdiction will
have had the most significant contacts with the litigants. Before proceeding
26. PROSS9R, TORTS 153, § 32 (3rd ed. 1964).
27. Compare, for example, the interpretations of what is due process in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
28. Compare, for example, the language in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878),
with that in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
29. Compare, for example, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), with Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; and Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 with
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
30. PXRKINS, CRIMINAL LAW § 9(C) (1957). Professor Perkins suggests that,
perhaps, "conceivably a different set of tests of proximate cause might be established
for each particular crime." Id. at 604.
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further, it might well serve to pause and consider a defect within the lan-
guage of the rule itself. The rule states that the law of the jurisdiction
with the most "significant contacts" should apply. Does this mean the
jurisdiction possessing most of the significant contacts, or the jurisdiction
possessing those contacts which are most significant? If the latter, then
there must necessarily be some hierarchy of importance of these contacts.
However, it would appear from the opinions that the former is closer to
the intention of the courts. This so-called "interest analysis" can be very
easy, i.e., where all the contacts are with one jurisdiction except for the
happening of the tort. This is the case in Griffith.
The application of the new rule to factual situations similar to Griffith
does not cause the uncertainty that some commentators fear. Where the only
contact with the lex loci state is the place of harm, as in Gri ith, it then
becomes the task of the advocate to present evidence showing which state
has the most "significant contact." In most cases this state will be the
forum state.
Perhaps this would be a good place to consider some of the hypothet-
icals that will present serious problems to the court. A great deal of the
litigation in this area involves motor vehicle accidents and though we
cannot present all of tile complex situations that may arise, the following
are representative of common situations involving accidents:
I. Plaintiff, a resident of State A, collides with an automobile driven
by defendant, a resident of State B, in State C. This is the extreme
situation with all three jurisdictions having seemingly equal "sig-
nificant contact" with the action. (It must be noted that plaintiff
will never bring his action in any tate that prohibits his action if
another forum is available. He will also choose the jurisdiction
which possesses no limit on his action or wherein the law is most
favorable to his side.) Consideration of existing limitations seems
to have borne considerable weight in previous decisions. In this
hypothetical it would seem that whichever jurisdiction the plaintiff
chose to bring his action in could show enough "significant con-
tact" to justify applying its law. A would claim it has a duty to
protect the interests of its residents besides being plaintiff's chosen
forum. B would claim that plaintiff had voluntarily chose its juris-
diction and that it had an interest in regulating the conduct of its
residents. C would claim that it had an interest in regulating its
highways and also th.t plaintiff had chosen its forum. Thus, where
three states possess equally "significant contacts", the plaintiff's
choice of forum will determine whose law will apply. In many
cases this choice will make little difference since the laws of A, B,
and C are similar.
II. However, what if C prohibited the action, B allowed the action but
limited the recovery, and A allowed both the action and complete
recovery. Plaintiff naturally will attempt to bring the action in A.
Thus the new rule appears to be leading to an application of the
law of the forum where the "significant contacts" appear. Obviously,
the plaintiff will attempt to obtain jurisdiction in the forum most
favorable to his interest.
[VOL. I0
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III. If both plaintiff and defendant reside in State A and the accident
is in State B, State A's interest in having its rules apply becomes
more evident since it has the right to regulate the conduct of its
residents and since no interest of State B other than its traffic laws
has been involved. 31 This hypothetical appears to be easier than
the factual situation in Griffith. However, what if state A limits
recovery while state B does not? Plaintiff will attempt to bring the
action in B; if he obtains jurisdiction, will B apply the limitations
of A? It would appear that A's law should apply, although B's
application of this rule is doubtful. No case has arisen where the
forum-state is the lex loci state, and yet, all of the remaining "sig-
nificant contacts" are with another state. Forum plus lex loci
coupled with a hardship to the plaintiff by another state may be
sufficient for B to apply its law rather than A's law.
IV. Another difficult problem arises where the parties live in different
jurisdictions and the accident occurs in the resident jurisdiction of
one of them. In most instances, if there are no existing restrictions,
the state possessing the dual contacts should have its law apply.
However, once a limitation is present, plaintiff will seek the juris-
diction possessing no limit. If it is his state that has both juris-
diction and dual contacts, he will probably be held to that limitation.
However, if defendant's jurisdiction has the limitation, plaintiff's
forum will probably refuse to apply the restriction even though de-
fendant's jurisdiction had the dual contacts.
V. Assume the factual situation of hypothetical I, however adding a
passenger in the plaintiff's car who is a resident of state D. This
original plaintiff has brought an action in A which has applied its
own rule, deciding A has the most "significant contacts." The
passenger now brings an action against the same defendant in D.
Is D bound by the finding of "significant contacts" by A? It would
seem not, since the basis for deciding the choice of law rests on the
relationship between the particular parties to the action.
VI. Assume the factual situation of V, however the passenger brings
the first action against both drivers of the two automobiles as joint
tortfeasors. The driver of the first vehicle crossclaims against the
second driver. Will state D look to the "significant contacts" of the
relationship between the first driver and the second driver, or will
D apply the choice of law between the passenger and the joint
tortfeasors to the cross claim? It would appear that one choice of
law should govern the entire action since the first driver has
chosen D's forum to cross-claim against the second driver. How-
ever, should the rule that one choice of law should govern the
entire action apply even where third party defendants have been
joined in the action?
There can be no general rule evolved from our hypotheticals. They
serve only to illustrate the rules which will be evolved. At the present
31. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). The court
faced with this situation avoided the direct issue by characterizing the action as a
matter of administration of decedent's estates, which is governed by the law of the
forum. For a comment on this decision by the writer of the opinion see Traynor,
Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. Riv. 657 (1959).
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